IGESSIGESS (Institute for Global Economics and Social Sciences)

This class provides an introductory course on Game Theory, which models and analyzes the strategic interactions between “players” (decision-makers) and has been applied to many scientific fields-most notably Economics, but also Business and Political Science etc. Ideas such as Nash equilibrium, backward induction, commitment, bargaining, auction, repeated interaction and cooperation are introduced. A variety of applications will also be discussed.

Game Theory models and analyzes the strategic interactions between “players” (decision-makers), and has been applied to many scientific fields: most notably Economics, but also Business and Political Science etc. This course provides an introductory course on Game Theory, intended for the first and second year students. You will learn the various ideas such as Nash equilibrium, backward induction, commitment, bargaining, credibility, repeated interaction and cooperation, and acquire new tools and insights for understanding and explaining socioeconomic phenomenon.

英語 / English

Lectures on demand. Every week, I will upload both a lecture video and a lecture note/hand out(in English), mainly based on the text book in Japanese 鈴木豊『完全理解ゲーム理論契約理論』（勁草書房）（Yutaka Suzuki, Game Theory and Contract Theory, Keisoshobo,2016), on the HOPPII system. I will also provide appropriate feedbacks on the submissions of reaction papers and assignments.

なし / No

なし / No

※各回の授業形態は予定です。教員の指示に従ってください。

1：Introduction

Overview of the Course.

2：Strategic Games 1

A simple Example: Player, Strategy, Payoff Matrix, Best Response, Equilibrium.

3：Strategic Games 2

Prisoner's Dilemma and its applications. Nash Equilibrium and Dominant Strategy Equilibrium.

4：Strategic Games 3

Chicken Games, Coordination Games. Games with Multiple Nash Equilibria.

5：Extensive form games 1

Game Tree Representation. Backward Induction.

6：Extensive form games 2

Examples for Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.

7：Extensive form games 3

Entry Deterrence and Credible Threat.

8：Extensive form games 4

Incentive Scheme: Fixed Pay vs. Performance-based Pay.

9：Bargaining 1

Introduction. Take-it-or-Leave-it Offer (TIOLI offer) Games.

10：Bargaining 2

Some Extensions.

11：Auction 1

Introduction. A variety of Auctions.

12：Auction 2

First Price Auction and Second Price Auction. Revenue Equivalence.

13：Repeated Games 1

Trigger Strategy. Repeated interaction and Cooperation.

14：Repeated Games 2

Some Applications.

This course emphasizes the ideas of the theory rather than the mathematical expressions and calculation, and no specific mathematical knowledge is required, though an ability to follow logical arguments is assumed. Students should review the class materials (Lecture Video, Handout, Textbook (in Japanese, but may be also useful for learning Japanese Language), and submit reaction papers (every time), three assignments (problem sets), and a final essay.

There are no specific textbooks in English.

Every week, I will provide a lecture note/hand out(in English), mainly based on the text book in Japanese 鈴木豊『完全理解ゲーム理論契約理論』（勁草書房）（Yutaka Suzuki, Game Theory and Contract Theory, Keisoshobo,2016).
https://www.keisoshobo.co.jp/book/b243556.html

No specific references, but the following textbooks may be helpful for the more advanced course or your future study.

1. Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press 1992
2. John McMillan, Games, Strategies, and Managers: How Managers Can Use Game Theory to Make Better Business Decisions. Oxford University Press 1996
3. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, Prentice-Hall 1992

Submission of Reaction Papers (every week)(20%), Three Assignments (Problem Sets as the Home work)(60%), and a Final (Short) Essay(20%).

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